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We say that a social choice function is continuously implementable “with small trans-
fers” if there exists a mechanism which yields the outcome close to the desired one
for all types close to the designer’s initial model. We show that when a generic cor-
relation condition is imposed on the class of interdependent values environments, any
incentive compatible social choice function is continuously implementable with small
transfers. This exhibits a stark contrast with Bergemann and Morris (2005) who show
that their global robustness amounts to ex post incentive compatibility as well as Oury
and Tercieux (2012) who show that continuous implementation generates a substantial
restriction, tightly connected to full implementation in rationalizable strategies.
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1 Introduction
The theory of mechanism design provides a unified framework which enables us to understand
the functioning of institutions (or mechanisms) ranging from simple trading rules to political
constitutions. This institutional design problem is particularly relevant when a group of
individuals with conflicting interests has to make a collective decision. The theory has
succeeded in identifying the class of objectives that can be implemented by some institution
in an incentive compatible manner.
While Bayesian mechanism design has been successful in generating many applica-
tions, it is rightly criticized for its sensitivity to the precise information that the agents and
the designer have about the environment. To properly describe an incomplete information
environment, an agent’s private information is summarized by the notion of type. For an
agent, a type specifies (i) his private information about his own preferences (payoff type);
(ii) his belief about the payoff types of others (first-order belief ); (iii) his belief about others’
first-order beliefs (second-order belief ), and so on, leading to an infinite hierarchy of beliefs.
A standard assumption in Bayesian mechanism design is that the underlying type space is
common knowledge among the agents as well as the designer.
This common knowledge assumption is at best an idealization of the reality. Indeed,
relaxing this assumption is the focus of the literature of robust mechanism design. One way of
putting robust mechanism design into operation is to explicate the implicit common knowl-
edge assumptions and then weaken them. Following Bergemann and Morris (2005), we fix a
payoff environment, specifying a set of payoff types for each agent, a set of outcomes, payoff
functions for each agent, and a social choice function (henceforth, SCF) that maps payoff
type profiles into outcomes. While holding this environment fixed, we can construct many
type spaces, where an agent’s type specifies both his payoff type and his belief about other
agents’ types. We say that an SCF is Bayesian implementable on a type space if there exist
a mechanism and one Bayes Nash equilibrium of that mechanism which yields the outcome
specified by the SCF for every payoff type profile. Due to Bergemann and Morris (2005),
we say that an SCF is robustly implementable if it is Bayesian implementable uniformly over
“all” type spaces. In what they call separable environments, Bergemann and Morris (2005)
show that an SCF is robustly implementable if and only if it is ex post implementable, which
2
is, by the revelation principle, equivalent to the SCF being ex post incentive compatible.1
However, this equivalence result carries negative news for robust mechanism design because
Jehiel et al. (2006) show that only constant SCFs are ex post incentive compatible when
payoff types are multi-dimensional and interdependent value functions are generic.2
To seek for more positive implementation results, we propose a local robustness of
Bayesian implementation. Formally, we fix a benchmark type space associated with a given
payoff type space and define an SCF that maps type profiles into outcomes. As our locally
robust implementation we adopt the notion of continuous implementation due to Oury and
Tercieux (2012) (henceforth, OT, 2012). We say that an SCF is continuously implementable
by a mechanism if there exists an equilibrium of the mechanism which yields the outcome
close to the desired one for all types “close to” the designer’s benchmark model. This notion
crucially depends on what we mean by “all types close to the designer’s benchmark model.”
We consider the closeness of types in terms of the product topology of weak convergence of
infinite belief hierarchies in the universal type space.3 To establish our main result, we further
assume that the agents’ payoff functions are quasilinear with respect to monetary transfers
and adopt a slightly modified version of continuous implementation. We say that an SCF
is continuously implementable with small transfers if it is continuously implementable by a
mechanism in which arbitrarily small transfers are added to both on and off the equilibrium.
Our main result (Theorem 1) shows that when a generic correlation condition is imposed on
the class of interdependent values environments, an SCF is continuously implementable with
small transfers if and only if it is incentive compatible.4 Since incentive compatibility is a
necessary condition for Bayesian (partial) implementation, our continuous implementation
result is as permissive as it can be.
We compare our paper with OT (2012), who are the first to propose the notion of
continuous implementation as a strengthening of partial implementation. In their Theorems
1,2, and 3, OT show that “strict” continuous implementation necessitates a substantial con-
1The reader is referred to Section 4.1 of Bergemann and Morris (2005) for the definition of separable
environments. In separable environments, only SCFs are considered.
2The reader is referred to Jehiel et al. (2006) for all the qualifications needed for their result.
3The universal type space is the collection of all coherent belief hierarchies. We refer the reader to Section
3.1 for its formal definition.
4We will be clear about what a generic correlation condition means in the next section and formally call
it Assumption 1. We can also handle private values environments as well.
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straint, which is tightly connected to that of full implementation.5 The way OT fill the gap
between continuous implementation and strict one is that they introduce the cost of sending
messages in the mechanism. When sending messages is costly, OT show in their Theorem
4 that an SCF is continuously implementable by a finite mechanism if and only if it is fully
implementable in rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism. As full implementation
by a finite mechanism is a stringent requirement,6 the permissive result of our Theorem 1
sharply contrasts the result of OT.
To obtain the permissive continuous implementation result, we depart from OT in
four aspects: (1) we study continuous implementation rather than strict continuous imple-
mentation; (2) we assume that each agent knows his own payoff type, as Bergemann and
Morris (2005) do in proposing their global robust implementation notion; (3) as in the clas-
sical mechanism design literature, we assume that messages are cheap-talk and the designer
can make use of (albeit arbitrarily small) transfers; and (4) agents’ beliefs satisfy a generic
correlation condition (see Assumption 1).7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how our main result is
proved in a heuristic manner and also discusses two special cases: the complete-information
benchmark model and the private-value environments. In Section 3, we introduce (i) the
general setup for the paper; (ii) the notion of continuous implementation with small transfers;
(iii) the notions of strategic distinguishability and the maximally revealing mechanism; and
(iv) the generic condition used in this paper (Assumption 1). In Section 4, we state the main
result of this paper (Theorem 1) and provide its proof. In Section 5, we provide a detailed
comparison with OT (2012). Section 6 concludes the paper. In the Appendix, we provide
all the proofs omitted from the main body of the paper.
5Full implementation requires all equilibrium outcomes of the implementing mechanism to result in the
desirable outcomes.
6More precisely, for incomplete-informaiton environments, the literature is yet to provide a characteri-
zation of full rationalizable implementation by a finite mechanism. In particular, Abreu and Matsushima
(1992b) characterize virtual (as opposed to exact) implementation in rationalizable strategies in incomplete
information environments with some domain restriction. Their domain restriction essentially induces this
paper’s environment with transfers. In contrast, Chen et al. (2019) show that when the designer deals with
complete information environments and can make use of lotteries and transfers, an SCF is exact imple-
mentable in rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity∗,
which is a strengthening of Maskin monotonicity proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011).
7We relegate a more detailed comparison with OT to Section 5.
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2 A Heuristic Argument
We turn to explain this paper’s theoretical contribution. We first describe how our main
result (Theorem 1) is proved in Figure 1. By “A → B” in the diagram, we mean that A is
used for proving B. There are three propositions used for proving our Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 shows that under Assumption 1 (to be explained later), if an SCF is in-
centive compatible, then it is fully implementable with arbitrarily small transfers in S∞Wˆ∞,
which is the set of message profiles surviving the iterative elimination of weakly dominated
messages followed by the iterative elimination of “interim” strictly dominated messages.8
Proposition 3 shows that the solution correspondence S∞Wˆ∞ in a finite mechanism is upper
hemicontinuous. This result is considered an extension of the well known upper hemicon-
tinuity of the interim correlated rationalizability correspondence to the case where players
know their own payoff types (see Dekel et al. (2007)). Therefore, Proposition 3 establishes
the continuity property of the implementing mechanism which is proposed by Proposition 1.
Finally, Proposition 4 shows that any Bayesian game with a finite action/message space and
a countable type space possesses a Bayes Nash equilibrium which survives S∞Wˆ∞. This,
together with Proposition 3, establishes the existence of an equilibrium which exhibits the
desirable robustness property for continuous implementation.9
We move on to elaborate how Proposition 1 is established. Following Bergemann and
Morris (2009b), we say that two payoff types θi and θ
′
i are strategically indistinguishable if
and only if Sˆ∞i (θi|M) 6= Sˆ∞i (θ′i|M) for any finite mechanism M, where Sˆ∞i (θi|M) denotes
the iterative elimination of strictly dominated messages for payoff type θi in the mechanism
M. We employ the maximally revealing mechanism M∗ due to Bergemann and Morris
(2009b) as a finite mechanism separating all strategically distinguishable payoff types. To
be precise, we adopt MBM from Bergemann and Morris (2009a) and modify it into as a
generic maximally revealing mechanism M∗. This is established in our Lemma 3.
8A message mi is weakly dominated by m
′
i if against any message profile and payoff type profile of the
other agents, mi yields at least as much payoff for agent i as m
′
i; moreover, for some message profile and
some payoff type profile of other agents, mi yields strictly higher payoff than m
′
i. The solution concept is
proposed by Chen et al. (2015) but they do not consider the case with Θ = ×i∈IΘi in which players know
their own payoff types (and the knowledge is never perturbed).
9The idea is similar to the result in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), which shows that each stable set
contains a stable set in the truncated game obtained by eliminating a weakly dominated strategy.
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Proposition 3y
Proposition 4 −−−→ Theorem 1x
Proposition 1 ←−−− Proposition 2x
Lemma 3 −−−→ Lemma 1 ←−−− Lemma 4
Figure 1: The Diagram of the Proof of Theorem 1
Second, following Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) and Abreu and Matsushima (1994),
we make use of what we call an extended direct mechanism M¯ in which each player an-
nounces K + 1 times of his own type. Moreover, as long as the players are truthful in their
first announcement in M¯, iterative deletion of never best responses implies that they will
also truthfully announce their own types “all the way” (i.e., in each of the K subsequent an-
nouncements). Each of the K announcements will only get to determine the allocation with
probability 1/K. When K is large, the construction serves to piecemeal the players’ incentive
to misreport their type. As a result, a small transfer suffices to incentivize truth-telling.
Finally, at the heart of our technical contribution is a step which we call augmentation.
In particular, we construct a new mechanism M¯∗ which “connects” the two mechanisms,
M∗ and M¯. Denote by l¯ some positive number of iterations, which terminates the iter-
ative deletion of strictly dominated messages in M∗. Each message mi in this augmented
mechanism M¯∗ takes the form of mi = (m0i ,m1i , . . . ,ml¯+3i ,ml¯+4i ,ml¯+5i ) in which m0i denotes a
message inM∗ and (ml¯+4i ,ml¯+5i ) denotes a message in M¯, and (m1i , . . . ,ml¯+3i ) is considered
a “bridge” between M∗ and M¯ in which agent i announces l¯ + 3 times of his own type.
We then introduce what we call Assumption 1, which enables us to elicit the true
type ti from the maximally revealing mechanism M∗. More precisely, our Proposition 2
shows that under Assumption 1, we can construct a transfer rule in such a way that if
a message profile m = (m0,m1, . . . ,ml¯+3,ml¯+4,ml¯+5) in the augmented mechanism M¯∗
survives S∞Wˆ∞, we have (m1i , . . . ,m
l¯+4
i ) = (ti, . . . , ti) for every type ti, i.e., telling the truth
all the way in the “bridge” part of M¯∗, and through “bridge,” the truth is also obtained in
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the first announcement of the extended direct mechanism.
The proof of Proposition 2 boils down to Lemma 1, which allows us to translate the
agents’ choice under Sˆ∞ in the maximally revealing mechanism M∗ into their behavior via
Wˆ∞ in the augmented mechanism M¯∗. One difficulty of this translation lies in showing that
a strictly dominated message in M∗ corresponds to a weakly dominated message in M¯∗.
This feature distinguishes our augmentation step from the augmentation step in Bergemann
and Morris (2009b). Specifically, thanks to the virtual implementation notion, the augmen-
tation performed in Bergemann and Morris (2009b) can always place a small yet positive
probability on outcomes of the maximally revealing mechanism. As a result, a strictly domi-
nated message in their maximally revealing mechanism continues to be a strictly dominated
message in the augmented mechanism.
Here, instead we would like to achieve exact implementation in terms of the allocation
rule and thereby the allocations inM∗ must be placed zero weight “in equilibrium”. Indeed,
the allocation rule inM∗ merely serve to elicit the payoff type information and need not be
socially desirable. Hence, a strictly dominated messages in their maximally revealing mech-
anism is at best a weakly dominated message in the augmented mechanism and establishing
the translation is a major challenge. This is achieved in Lemma 4.
Once we establish the translation of each strictly dominated messages in M∗ into a
weakly dominated message in M¯∗, agent i with two strategically distinguishable types must
be associated with different set of Sˆ∞i (θi|M) and thereby report distinct messages in m0i .
Then, Assumption 1 allows us to make use of proper scoring rules to incentivize each player
to report his type truthfully in m0i . Similarly, we can establish that agents tell the truth
throughout their announcements in the “bridge” (i.e., (m1i , . . . ,m
l¯+3
i ) = (ti, . . . , ti)) the 1st
announcement in M¯ (i.e., ml¯+4i = ti), and hence Proposition 2. Finally, recall that in M¯,
as long as the players are truthful in their first announcement, they will also truthfully
announce their own types “all the way” (i.e., in each of the K subsequent announcements).
Hence, agents tell the truth throughout their announcements in M¯∗.
There are two special cases which deserve a separate discussion. First, when the agents’
values are private, we can replace S∞Wˆ∞ with S∞W in our Proposition 1 where S∞W
stands for one round removal of interim weakly dominated messages followed by the iterative
deletion of interim strictly dominated messages. That is, one round deletion of weakly
dominated messages suffices. The second special case is a complete information environment.
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While a conventional wisdom suggests that it is without loss of generality to assume that
agents’ values are private, assuming so does entail a loss of generality if we are to satisfy
Assumption 1. To see this, we consider two situations separately.
First, Abreu and Matsushima (1994) study a private-value complete-information en-
vironment and assume that different payoff types have different preferences over lottery
allocations. Abreu and Matsushima (1994) show that in complete-information environments
with at least three agents, any SCF is fully implementable in S∞W . As different payoff
types have different preferences over lottery allocations, for each players, they are strate-
gically distinguishable and, given complete information, Assumption 1 trivially holds (see
also the explanation after Assumption 1). Moreover, according to the private-value assump-
tion, S∞Wˆ∞ = S∞W under complete information; hence, the mechanism M¯∗ reduces to
the mechanism constructed in Abreu and Matsushima (1994). We document this case as
Corollary 1.
In contrast, when values are interdependent, two different payoff type profiles might
induce the same preferences for some agents over lottery allocations. This possibility renders
the assumption of Abreu and Matsushima (1994) invalid. To wit, when we “translate” the
interdependent-value model with complete information into a private-value model, a payoff
type profile in the former is identified with a payoff type in the latter. As the result of
Abreu and Matsushima (1994) becomes inapplicable, we cannot appeal to implementation
in S∞W and must exploit the full force of S∞Wˆ∞ to prove Proposition 1 as we do here. We
document this more subtle case as Corollary 2.
In sum, regardless of whether we deal with complete or incomplete information envi-
ronments, the mileage of our Proposition 1 over the existing literature lies in establishing a
permissive implementation result in interdependent-value environments.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the basic setup and concepts used throughout the paper. Sec-
tion 3.1 introduces the general setup for the paper. In Section 3.2, we introduce our notion
of continuous implementation. Section 3.3 elaborates on the notion of strategic distinguisha-
bility and the maximally revealing mechanism, both of which are proposed by Bergemann
and Morris (2009b).
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3.1 The Environment
Let I denote a finite set of players and with abuse of notation, we also denote by I the
cardinality of the set I. The set of pure social alternatives is denoted by A, and ∆ (A)
denotes the set of all probability distributions over A with countable supports. In this
context, a ∈ A denotes a pure social alternative and x ∈ ∆(A) denotes a lottery on A.
The utility index of player i over the set A is denoted by ui : A × Θ → R, where
Θ = Θ1× · · · ×ΘI is the finite set of payoff type profiles. We therefore assume that Θ has a
product structure. We allow for interdependent values and ui(a, θ) specifies the (bounded)
utility of player i from the social alternative a under type profile θ ∈ Θ. We also write
Θ−i = Θ1 × · · · × Θi−1 × Θi+1 × · · · × ΘI .10 We abuse notation to also denote by ui(x, θ)
player i’s expected utility from a lottery allocation x ∈ ∆ (A) under θ. Assume that player
i’s utility is quasilinear in transfers, denoted by ui(x, θ) + τi where τi ∈ R.
We follow the same setup as Bergemann and Morris (2005) and Bergemann and Morris
(2011). Specifically, a model T is a triplet (Ti, θˆi, pii)i∈I , where T is a countable type space;
θˆi : Ti → Θi; and pii(ti) ∈ ∆(T−i) denotes the associated interim belief for each ti ∈ Ti.
We assume that the model is common knowledge among all players. We also assume that
each player knows his own type ti (and hence his payoff type (θˆi(ti)).
11 For each type profile
t = (ti)i∈I , let θˆ(t) denote the payoff type profile at t, i.e., θˆ(t) ≡ (θˆi(ti))i∈I . If Ti is a finite
set for every player i, then we say that (Ti, θˆi, pii)i∈I is a finite model. Let pii (ti) [E] denote
the probability that pii (ti) assigns to any set E ⊂ T−i.
Given a model (Ti, θˆi, pii)i∈I and a type ti ∈ Ti, the first-order belief of ti on Θ is
computed as follows: for any θ ∈ Θ,
h1i (ti) [θ] = pii (ti)
[{
t−i ∈ T−i :
(
θˆi(ti), θˆ−i(t−i)
)
= θ
}]
.
The second-order belief of ti is his belief about the set of payoff types and first-order beliefs
of player i’s opponents. Formally, for any measurable set F ⊂ Θ×∆ (Θ)I−1, we set
h2i (ti)[F ] = pii(ti)
[{
t−i :
(
θˆ(ti, t−i), h1−i(t−i)
)
∈ F
}]
.
10Similar notation will be used for other product sets.
11As Oury (2015) argue in footnote 8 (p.659), except a special case of private values environments, OT’s
argument (in proving their Theorems 1-3) cannot be applied to when it is assumed that each player knows
his payoff type and that the state space can be written as the product space of payoff types. See footnote
17 for further elaboration.
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An entire hierarchy of beliefs can be computed similarly.
(
h1i (ti), h
2
i (ti), ..., h
`
i(ti), ...
)
is an
infinite hierarchy of beliefs induced by type ti of player i.
The set of all belief hierarchies with “common certainty” that their beliefs are coher-
ent (i.e., each player’s beliefs at different orders are consistent with each other and this is
commonly believed) is the universal type space; see Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Bran-
denburger and Dekel (1993). We denote by T ∗i the set of player i’s hierarchies of beliefs
in this space and write T ∗ =
∏
i∈I T
∗
i . T
∗
i is endowed with the product topology so that a
sequence of types {ti,n}∞n=0 converges to a type ti (denoted as ti,n →p ti) if, for every l ∈ N,
hli(ti,n)→ hli(ti) as n→∞. We write tn →p t if ti,n →p ti for all i ∈ I.
Throughout the paper, we consider a fixed environment E which is a triplet (A,Θ, (ui)i∈I)
with a finite benchmark model T¯ = (T¯i, θ¯i, p¯ii)i∈I . We also consider a planner who aims to
implement a social choice function (henceforth, SCF) f : T¯ → ∆ (A). The following defini-
tion of incentive compatibility is standard.
Definition 1 An SCF f : T¯ → ∆(A) is incentive compatible if, for all i ∈ I and all
ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i,∑
t−i∈T¯−i
ui(f(ti, t−i), (θˆi(ti), θˆ−i(t−i)))p¯ii(ti)[t−i] ≥
∑
t−i∈T¯−i
ui(f(t
′
i, t−i), (θˆi(ti), θˆ−i(t−i)))p¯ii(ti)[t−i].
3.2 Mechanisms and Continuous Implementation
We assume that the planner can penalize or reward any player by collecting or making side
payments. A mechanism M is a triplet ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I where Mi is the nonempty finite
message space for player i; g : M → ∆ (A) is an outcome function; and τi : M → R is
a transfer rule which specifies the payment from player i to the designer. For any αi ∈
∆ (Mi) and α−i ∈ ∆ (M−i), we abuse the notation to denote by g (αi, α−i) the induced
lottery in ∆ (A) and by τi (αi, α−i) the induced expected transfer. In the mechanism M =
(Mi), g, (τi))i∈I), we define τˆ = maxi∈I maxm∈M |τi(m)| as the bound of transfer rule (τi)i∈I .
We denote by Mτˆ a mechanism whose transfer rule is bounded by τˆ .
Given a mechanismM and a model T , we write U (M, T ) for the induced incomplete
information game. In the game U (M, T ) , a (behavior) strategy of a player i is σi : Ti →
∆ (Mi) . We follow Oury and Tercieux (2012) to write down the following definitions. A
function ν−i : T−i → ∆ (M−i) is called a conjecture of player i. We define the interim payoff
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of type ti by choosing (mixed) message αi against conjecture ν−i as:
Vi((αi, ν−i), ti) =
∑
t−i
pii(ti)[t−i]
[
ui(g(αi, ν−i (t−i)), θˆ(t)) + τi(αi, ν−i(t−i))
]
.
Definition 2 A profile of strategies σ = (σ1, ..., σI) is a Bayes Nash equilibrium in
U(M, T ) if, for each player i ∈ I and each type ti ∈ Ti,
mi ∈ supp (σi (ti))⇒ mi ∈ argmaxm′i∈MiVi ((m
′
i, σ−i) , ti) .
We say that a strategy profile σ is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium if, for every i ∈ I
and ti ∈ Ti, σi(ti) is the unique solution to maxm′i∈MiVi ((m′i, σ−i) , ti). By definition, a strict
Bayes Nash equilibrium is necessarily a pure strategy equilibrium.
We write σ|T¯ for the strategy profile σ restricted to T¯ . For any T = (Ti, θˆi, pii)i∈I , we
will write T ⊃ T¯ if T ⊃ T¯ and for every ti ∈ T¯i, we have pii (ti) [E] = p¯ii (ti)
[
T¯−i ∩ E
]
for
any measurable subset E ⊂ T−i.
Definition 3 Fix a mechanism M and a model T such that T¯ ⊂ T . We say that a Bayes
Nash equilibrium σ in U (M, T ) (strictly) continuously implements the SCF f : T¯ →
∆(A) if the following two conditions hold: (i) σ|T¯ is a (strict) Bayes Nash equilibrium in
U
(M, T¯ ); (ii) for any t ∈ T¯ and any sequence tn →p t, whenever tn ∈ T for each n, we
have (g ◦ σ)(tn)→ f(t).
Remark: In their definition of continuous implementation, Oury and Tercieux (2012) require
in addition that σ|T¯ be a pure strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium. As they mainly focus on
strict continuous implementation in the paper, this restriction is inconsequential. Here we
focus on continuous implementation rather than strict continuous implementation and do
not impose the requirement that σ|T¯ be a pure strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium.
We introduce the notion of continuous implementation with arbitrarily small transfers:
Definition 4 An SCF f : T¯ → ∆ (A) is continuously implementable with arbitrarily
small transfers if, for any τˆ > 0, there exists a mechanismMτˆ such that for each model T
with T¯ ⊂ T , there is a Bayes Nash equilibrium σ in U (M, T ) that continuously implements
the SCF f .
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3.3 Strategic Distinguishability
Given a mechanismM = (M, g), we first define the process of iterative elimination of strictly
dominated messages, which makes no assumptions on each player’s belief about the other
players’ payoff types. We set Sˆ0i (θi|M) = Mi and for each l ≥ 0, we inductively define
Sˆl+1i (θi|M)
=
 mi ∈ Sˆli (θi|M)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃αi ∈ ∆ (Mi) s.t. ui (g (αi,m−i) , (θi, θ−i)) + τi (αi,m−i)
> ui (g (mi,m−i) , (θi, θ−i)) + τi (mi,m−i)
for any m−i ∈ Sˆl−i (θ−i|M) and any θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
 .
Finally, we let Sˆ∞i (θi|M) =
⋂
l≥0 Sˆ
l
i (θi|M) and call it the set of message profiles for payoff
type θi which survive iterative elimination of strictly dominated messages. We introduce the
following notion of strategic distinguishability developed by Bergemann and Morris (2009a).
Definition 5 We say that payoff types θi and θ
′
i are strategically indistinguishable (we
denote it by θi ∼ θ′i) if Sˆ∞i (θi|M)∩ Sˆ∞i (θ′i|M) 6= ∅ in any mechanism M.
In their Proposition 2, Bergemann and Morris (2009b) construct a mechanism MBM
=
(
MBM, gBM
)
with the property that if θi 6∼ θ′i, then Sˆ∞i
(
θi|MBM
)∩ Sˆ∞i (θ′i|MBM) = ∅.
Since MBM is finite, there exists some positive number l¯ such that, for any i ∈ I, and θi ∈ Θi,
we have
Sˆli
(
θi|MBM
)
= Sˆ∞i
(
θi|MBM
)
,∀l ≥ l¯. (1)
The number l¯ will be used later in designing our mechanism for continuous implementation.
Let ∼∗ be the transitive closure of the binary relation ∼. For each player i of payoff type
θi, we define Pi (θi) = {θ′i ∈ Θi|θ′i ∼∗ θi}. Since ∼∗ is transitive, it follows that {Pi (θi)}θi∈Θi
forms a partition over Θi, which we denote by Pi. For any mi ∈ Sˆ∞i
(
θi|MBM
)
, we are able
to identify the unique Pi (θi) ∈ Pi.
To formulate our assumption, observe first that Pi induces a partition Ψ0i over T¯i,
i.e., Ψ0i = {ψ0i (ti)}ti∈T¯i such that, for any types ti and t′i in T¯i, t′i ∈ ψ0i (ti) if and only if
θˆi (t
′
i) ∈ Pi(θˆi(ti)). Let χ0i (ti) denote the belief over Ψ0−i for player i of type ti, that is,
χ0i (ti)
[
ψ0−i
]
=
∑
t−i∈ψ0−i
pii(ti) [t−i] .
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Moreover, χ0i (·) and Ψ0i jointly induce another partition Ψ1i over T¯i, i.e., Ψ1i = {ψ1i (ti)}ti∈T¯i
in which for any types ti and t
′
i in T¯i, we have t
′
i ∈ ψ1i (ti) if and only if χ0i (ti) = χ0i (t′i) and
t′i belongs to ψ
0
i (ti). Let χ
1
i (ti) denote the belief of type ti over Ψ
1
−i. We are now ready to
state our key assumption.
Assumption 1 For any player i ∈ I, any pair of types ti and t′i in T¯i with ti 6= t′i, we have
χ1i (ti) 6= χ1i (t′i) .
Assumption 1 says that each player’s types can be fully identified with their belief
over ×j 6=i
(
Ψ0j ×∆(Ψ0−j)
)
, i.e., their beliefs over the partition Ψ0−i (induced by strategically
distinguishable payoff types of their opponents) and over their belief over Ψ0−j.
12 Assumption
1 holds if each player’s distinct types hold different beliefs over Ψ0−i. Hence, provided that
at least two players have nontrivial partition under P , Assumption 1 generically holds over
the space of probability distributions over T¯ . However, Assumption 1 does not hold if the
players’ types are independently distributed according to a common prior.
To elaborate Assumption 1 further, consider a complete-information model, i.e., a
model T CI = (TCIi , θˆi, pii)i∈I where for each i ∈ I, TCIi =
⋃
θ∈Θ {ti,θ} and for each θ =
(θ)i∈I ∈ Θ, we have θˆi(ti,θ) = θi and pii(ti,θ) [t−i,θ] = 1. In other words, at any payoff type
profile θ, it is common knowledge among all the players that payoff type profile is θ. In this
case, Assumption 1 holds if Pi is the finest partition {{θi} |θi ∈ Θi}. Then, it follows that
ψ0i (ti,θ) = ψ
0
i (ti,θ′) only if θi = θ
′
i; moreover, χ
0
i (ti,θ) = χ
0
i (ti,θ′) only if θ−i = θ
′
−i. Hence,
ψ1j (tj,θ) = {tj,θ} for each θ and each j. It follows that χ1i (ti,θ) = χ1i (ti,θ′) only if ti,θ = ti,θ′ .
We name two prominent situations where Pi is the finest partition. First, if the players’
values are private (i.e., ui : ∆ (A)×Θi → R), then Pi is the finest partition if different payoff
types induce different preferences over the lottery allocations. This is the assumption made in
Abreu and Matsushima (1994). Second, if the players’ values are interdependent, Bergemann
and Morris (2009a) show that Pi is the finest possible partition when the following three
12It is also straightforward to extend the idea and define partition Ψki for any k ≥ 2. That is, Ψki the
partition over T¯i, which is induced by χ
k−1
i (·) and Ψk−1i . Since
{
Ψki
}
is a sequence of increasingly finer
partitions over T¯i which is a finite set, Ψ
k
i becomes a fixed partition Ψi for any k sufficiently large. We can
still prove our continuous implementation result by weakening Assumption 1 to the requirement that the
SCF is measurable with respect to Ψ. Here we impose the stronger assumption for simplicity, as our goal is
to include the special case with a complete-information benchmark model and Pi being the finest partition
{{θi} |θi ∈ Θi} so that Corollaries 1 and 2 in the next section follow from Theorem 1.
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conditions are all satisfied: (1) there is a strictly ex post incentive compatible SCF; (2)
players have single-crossing preferences; (3) the players’ preferences satisfy a condition called
the contraction property, which demands that value interdependence be not too large. Based
upon the two prominent situations, we will derive Corollaries 1 and 2 from Theorem 1 in the
next section.
4 Main Result
In this section, we discuss our main result. In Section 4.1, we first state our main result for-
mally and next illustrate the logic of the proof in a heuristic manner. Section 4.2 introduces
the solution concept of S∞Wˆ∞, i.e., the set of message profiles which survive the iterative
elimination of weakly dominated messages followed by the iterative elimination of interim
strictly dominated messages. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we explanation our key augmentation
step which “combines” a generic version of the maximally revealing mechanism and a mech-
anism akin to the one used in Abreu and Matsushima (1994) into a single implementing
mechanism. Section 4.5 provides the proof of Theorem 1.
4.1 The Theorem
We now state the main result of this paper:
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, an SCF f : T¯ → ∆ (A) is continuously
implementable with arbitrarily small transfers if and only if it is incentive compatible.
We relegate the proof of this theorem to Section 4.5 and only outline the steps in
the rest of the section. Observe that the equilibrium which continuously implements f also
implements f in T¯ . Then, a limiting argument taking the transfer bound to zero shows
that incentive compatibility is a necessary condition for continuous implementation with
arbitrarily small transfers. The main task is therefore to prove the “if” part of Theorem 1,
which is the focus of our discussion below.
Let f be an SCF which is incentive compatible. We structure the main argument in two
steps: first, we show that under Assumption 1, we can implement the SCF f under a solution
concept of S∞Wˆ∞ (to be defined in Section 4.2) with arbitrarily small transfers. Second, we
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show that if the SCF f is implementable in S∞Wˆ∞ with arbitrarily small transfers, then it
must be continuously implementable with arbitrarily small transfers.
To grasp the basic idea, consider a benchmark model with complete information. First,
assume, as in Abreu and Matsushima (1994), that values are private (i.e., ui : ∆ (A)×Θi →
R) and different payoff types induce different preferences over lottery allocations. Under
this assumption, Abreu and Matsushima (1994) show that any social choice function can
be implemented in one round deletion of (interim) weakly dominated messages followed by
iterative deletion of (interim) strictly dominated messages (i.e., S∞W ) by a finite mechanism.
Thanks to the private-value assumption, interim weak dominance is equivalent to iterative
weak dominance and S∞Wˆ∞ = S∞W . Hence, we obtain the following corollary. The
corollary can be separately proved by simply invoking the mechanism constructed in Abreu
and Matsushima (1994) and observing that for any model T , there is a trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium σ which survives S∞W .
Corollary 1 In a complete information model T CI = (TCIi , θˆi, pii)i∈I . Suppose that different
payoff types θi and θ
′
i induce different preferences over lottery allocations ∆ (A). Then, an
SCF f : T¯ → ∆ (A) is continuously implementable with arbitrarily small transfers if and
only if it is incentive compatible.
When we consider a complete information model with interdependent values, however,
the approach of Abreu and Matsushima (1994) applies only when different type profiles
induce different preferences over lottery allocations.13 We do not need to make this stronger
assumption. Indeed, as we remark in Section 3.3, to make Assumption 1 hold under a
complete-information benchmark, we only need to require that the partition Pi be the finest
possible. A leading example of such an interdependent-value environment has been studied
by Bergemann and Morris (2009a) which we briefly recap at the end of the previous section.
We document this more permissive special case as another corollary.
Corollary 2 In a complete information model T CI = (TCIi , θˆi, pii)i∈I . Suppose that Pi is
the finest possible partition {{θi} |θi ∈ Θi}. Then, an SCF f : T¯ → ∆ (A) is continuously
implementable with arbitrarily small transfers if and only if it is incentive compatible.
13More precisely, when we translate the interdependent-value model to a private-value model (by means
of the complete-information assumption and in order to apply Abreu and Matsushima (1994)), a payoff type
in the latter corresponds to a payoff type profile in the former.
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Note that in this second case, our result is not reduced to that of Abreu and Matsushima
(1994) even though we consider a complete-information benchmark T¯ . In other words,
whether we deal with complete information or incomplete information, the mileage of our
Proposition 1 over the existing literature lies in the case with interdependent values.
4.2 The Solution Concept of S∞Wˆ∞
In proving Theorem 1, our major step is to show that any incentive compatible SCF is
implementable in S∞Wˆ∞ with arbitrarily small transfers. To formalize this first step, we
first define the solution concept of S∞Wˆ∞. Given a mechanismM, we first define the process
of iterative elimination of weakly dominated messages. As the process of iterative elimination
of strictly dominated messages, iterative elimination of weakly dominated messages makes
no assumption on each player’s belief about other players’ payoff types.
We set Wˆ 0i (θi|M) = Mi and for each integer l ≥ 0, we inductively define
Wˆ l+1i (θi|M)
=

mi ∈ Wˆ li (θi|M)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃αi ∈ ∆ (Mi) s.t. ui (g (αi,m−i) , (θi, θ−i)) + τi (αi,m−i)
≥ ui (g (mi,m−i) , (θi, θ−i)) + τi (mi,m−i)
for any m−i ∈ Wˆ l−i (θ−i|M) and any θ−i ∈ Θ−i and a strict inequality
holds for some m−i ∈ Wˆ l−i (θ−i|M) and some θ−i ∈ Θ−i

.
Finally, we say that Wˆ∞i (θi|M) ≡
⋂
l≥0 Wˆ
l
i (θi|M) is the set of messages surviving the
iterative deletion of weakly dominated messages for payoff type θi.
We define a solution concept S∞Wˆ∞ as follows. We set S0i Wˆ
∞ (ti|M, T ) = Wˆ∞i (θˆi(ti)|M)
and for each integer l ≥ 1, we inductively define mi ∈ Sl+1i Wˆ∞ (ti|M, T ) if and only if there
does not exist αi ∈ ∆(Mi) such that
Vi((αi, ν−i), ti) > Vi((mi, ν−i), ti)
for all conjecture ν−i : T−i →M−i and all t−i ∈ T−i such that ν−i(t−i) ∈ Sl−iWˆ∞ (t−i|M, T )
for each t−i where Sl−iWˆ
∞ (t−i|M, T ) ≡
∏
j 6=i S
l
jWˆ
∞ (tj|M, T ). Let S∞Wˆ∞ denote the
set of message profiles which survive the iterative deletion of weakly dominated messages
followed by iterative removal of interim strictly dominated messages, i.e.,
S∞i Wˆ
∞ (ti|M, T ) =
∞⋂
l=1
SliWˆ
∞ (ti|M, T ) ,
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Finally, we define
S∞Wˆ∞ (t|M, T ) =
∏
i∈I
S∞i Wˆ
∞ (ti|M, T ) .
We do not intend to justify the plausibility of the solution concept S∞Wˆ∞. The solution
concept S∞Wˆ∞ is entirely instrumental in our proof. That is, implementation in S∞Wˆ∞ is
only an intermediate step towards achieving our result of continuous implementation. We
now formally define the notion of implementation in S∞Wˆ∞ with arbitrarily small transfers.
Definition 6 An SCF f : T¯ → ∆ (A) is (fully) implementable in S∞Wˆ∞ with arbitrarily
small transfers if for any τˆ > 0, there exists a mechanism Mτˆ such that g(m) = f(t) for
every m ∈ S∞Wˆ∞ (t|Mτˆ , T¯ ) and every t ∈ T¯ .
We can now formally state our first step of the proof of Theorem 1 as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. If an SCF f is incentive compatible, then
it is implementable in S∞Wˆ∞ with arbitrarily small transfers.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Although we relegate a formal proof to the appendix, we will illustrate a main step
which we call augmentation in the next two subsections.
4.3 The Mechanism
Definition 7 We say that M¯ = ((M¯i), g¯, (τ¯i))i∈I is an extended direct mechanism if (a)
for each i ∈ I, M¯i = T¯i× · · · × T¯i consists of finitely many copies of T¯i and g¯ (t, ..., t) = f (t)
for every t ∈ T¯ ; (b) the truth-telling strategy profile (i.e., (σi)i∈I with σi (ti) = (ti, ..., ti) for
all ti ∈ T¯i) constitutes a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium in the game U
(M¯, T¯ ) induced by
mechanism M¯.
In proving Proposition 1, we construct what we call an augmented mechanism M¯∗ =
((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I which builds upon and “combines” a maximally revealing mechanismM∗ =
((M∗i ) , g
∗, (τ ∗i ))i∈I and a extended direct mechanism M¯ =
(
(M¯i), g¯, (τ¯i)
)
i∈I .
14 The aug-
mented mechanism has the following components.
14We construct the maximally revealing mechanism in Lemma 3 and the extended direct mechanism in
the proof of Proposition 1.
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1. The message space:
Player i’s message space is
Mi = M
0
i ×M1i × · · · ×M l¯+3i ×M l¯+4i ×M l¯+5i = M∗i × T¯i × · · · × T¯i︸ ︷︷ ︸×M¯i,
where M¯i = M
l¯+4
i ×M l¯+5i ; M l¯+4i = T¯i; and M l¯+5i consists of K copies of T¯i. That is,
each player i simultaneously makes an announcement in M∗i , l¯ + 3 announcements of
his own type, and finally an announcement in M¯i.
2. The outcome function:
Let  ∈ (0, 1) be a small positive number. Define e : M → R by
e(m) =
 , if mli 6= m2i for some i ∈ I and some l ∈ {3, . . . , l¯ + 3},0, otherwise.. (2)
Based on the outcome function g∗ in the maximally revealing mechanism M∗ and
the outcome function g¯ of the mechanism M¯, the outcome function of the augmented
mechanism g : M → ∆ (A) is defined as follows: for each m ∈M ,
g (m) = e(m)× g∗(m0) + (1− e(m))× g¯(ml¯+4,ml¯+5). (3)
3. The transfer rule:
In addition to τ ∗i (i.e., the transfer rule in M∗) and τ¯i (i.e., the transfer rule in M¯),
player i makes l¯ + 5 payments of three different sorts which we denote by τ 0i (m
1
i ,m
0
−i),
τ 1i (m
2
i ,m
1
−i,m
0
−i), and τ
2
i (m
l
i,m
l−1
−i )) for any l = 2, . . . , l¯ + 4 where τ
0
i , τ
1
i and τ
2
i will be
defined in Section A.2.1. They are essentially the proper scoring rules (to elicit the players’
true type) which satisfy a generic condition with a total bound denoted by τ . Hence, under
a message profile m, player i pays a total equal to:
τi(m) = τ
∗
i
(
m0
)
+ τ 0i (m
1
i ,m
0
−i) + τ
1
i (m
2
i ,m
1
−i,m
0
−i) +
l¯+4∑
l=3
τ 2i (m
l
i,m
l−1
−i ) + τ¯i(m
l¯+4
i ,m
l¯+5
i ), (4)
The precise specification of the transfer rule and the choice of parameters of the mechanism
(including the size of transfers) can be found in Appendix A.2.1 in proving Proposition 2
which we will explain in the next section.
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4.4 Augmentation
Proposition 2 is the key step to prove Proposition 1 which we call augmentation. This is
at the heart of our technical contribution to obtain continuous implementation in Theorem
1. Formally, given any maximally revealing mechanism M∗, Proposition 2 shows that we
can choose the transfer rule and the parameters in the augmented mechanism M¯∗ such that
the transfer rule is bounded by the transfer bound of the maximally revealing mechanism;
moreover, each player reports his true type in the “bridge” component up until the first
announcement of the extended direct mechanism M¯. More precisely, for each player i of
type ti we have m
l
i = ti for each l = 2, ..., l + 4 as long as mi belongs to S
∞
i Wˆ
∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ).
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let M∗ be a maximally revealing mech-
anism with transfer rule bounded by τˆ /3 and an extended direct mechanism M¯. Then, there
exists an augmented mechanism M¯∗ = ((Mi) , g, (τi))i∈I such that (a) the transfer rule τi (·)
is bounded by τˆ ; (b) if the transfer size in M¯ is sufficiently small, then for each i ∈ I, each
ti ∈ T¯i, and each mi ∈ S∞i Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ), we have mli = ti for l = 2, ..., l + 4.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
By Proposition 2, the transfer rule of the augmented mechanism is bounded by three
times of the transfer bound of the maximally revealing mechanismM∗. Hence, to make the
overall transfer size small, it suffices to reduce the transfer size in M∗. Lemma 1 below is
the key to prove Proposition 2.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For any player i of type ti ∈ T¯i and any
l = 0, 1, ..., l¯, the following two statements, denoted by P 1(l) and P 2(l), hold:
• P 1(l): for any mˆi ∈Mi, mˆi ∈ Wˆ li (θˆi(ti)|M¯∗) implies mˆ0i ∈ Sˆli(θˆi(ti)|M∗);
• P 2(l): there is some (m0i , ...,mli,ml+1i ) ∈ ×l+1k=0Mk such that for every t′i ∈ T¯i,(
m0i , ...,m
l
i,m
l+1
i , t
′
i, ti, ..., ti
) ∈ Wˆ li (θˆi(ti)|M¯∗).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
In words, P 1(l) says that in each deletion step of weakly dominated messages, announc-
ing mˆ0i which is strictly dominated in the maximally revealing mechanism M∗ must result
in a weakly dominated message in the augmented mechanism M¯∗. P 2(l) ensures that at
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least two inconsistent announcements exist (i.e., there exists some k > 2 such that mki 6= m2i
in message mi) in a message of the opponents surviving the previous round of deletion. It
follows from Lemma 1 that mi ∈ Wˆ∞i (θi|M¯∗) implies mˆ0i ∈ Sˆ∞i (θi|M∗).
We conclude the section by briefly commenting on the difference between the aug-
mentation established via Proposition 2 and the augmentation in Abreu and Matsushima
(1992a) and Bergemann and Morris (2009b). First, Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) adopt
an interim solution concept in both the maximally revealing mechanism and the augmented
mechanism, whereas Bergemann and Morris (2009b) adopt a solution concept in both the
maximally revelation mechanism and the augmented mechanism. Here our augmented mech-
anism adopts a “belief-free” solution concept that starts by taking a perspective of knowing
the payoff state but switches to an interim perspective once we succeed in eliciting the payoff
type information.
Second, both Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) and Bergemann and Morris (2009b) work
with the solution concept of iterated strict dominance. In contrast, P 1(l) in Lemma 1 shows
that each weakly undominated message in the augmented mechanism M¯∗ must announce a
strictly undominated message in the maximally revealing mechanism M∗. Due to the two
differences, the proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 is substantially different from the proof
of augmentation in Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) or Bergemann and Morris (2009b).
4.5 Proof of Theorem 1
Based on Proposition 1, the proof of Theorem 1 is completed following two further steps.
First, Proposition 3 establishes the upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence S∞Wˆ∞
which is similar to the well known upper hemicontinuity of the interim correlated rational-
izable strategies (see Dekel et al. (2007)).
Proposition 3 Fix any model T such that T¯ ⊂ T and any mechanism M. Then, for
any t ∈ T¯ and any sequence {tn}∞n=0 in T such that tn →p t, we have S∞Wˆ∞(tn|M, T ) ⊂
S∞Wˆ∞(t|M, T ) for any n large enough.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Second, Proposition 4 states that there exists a Bayes Nash equilibrium of the game
U
(M¯∗, T ) which survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated messages.
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Proposition 4 Fix any model T such that T¯ ⊂ T and any mechanism M. Then, there
exists an equilibrium σ in the game U (M, T ) such that for any player i of type ti, we have
σi (ti) ∈ Wˆ∞i (θˆi(ti)|M).
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1 which we restate here for the ease of reference:
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, an SCF f : T¯ → ∆ (A) is continu-
ously implementable with arbitrarily small transfers if and only if it is incentive compatible.
Proof. We first prove the “if” part. For any τˆ > 0, by Proposition 1, for any t ∈ T¯ , there
is some mechanism Mτˆ such that m ∈ S∞Wˆ∞ (t|Mτˆ , T¯ ) implies that g (m) = f (t).
Now pick any model T ⊃ T¯ . We show that there exists an equilibrium which continu-
ously implements f on T¯ . By Proposition 4, there is an equilibrium σ in the game U(Mτˆ , T )
such that σi(ti) ∈ Wˆ∞i (θˆi(ti)|Mτˆ ) for every type ti of every player i. Since σ is an equi-
librium in U(Mτˆ , T ), σ|T¯ is an equilibrium in U
(Mτˆ , T¯ ). Now, pick any sequence {tn}∞n=0
such that tn →p t. By Proposition 3, S∞Wˆ∞
(
tn|Mτˆ , T
) ⊂ S∞Wˆ∞ (t|Mτˆ , T¯ ) for any n
large enough. Moreover, σ(tn) ∈ Wˆ∞(θˆ(tn)|Mτˆ ). Since Θ is finite, for any n large enough,
we have θˆ(tn) = θˆ(t), it follows that σ(t) ∈ S∞Wˆ∞
(
tn|Mτˆ , T¯
)
. Thus, by Proposition 1, we
have (g ◦ σ)(tn) = f(t).
The “only-if” part is proved as follows: Assume that the SCF f is continuously imple-
mentable with arbitrarily small transfers. Then, for any τˆ > 0, there is a mechanism Mτˆ
and a Bayes Nash equilibrium σ in U(Mτˆ , T¯ ) such that
(g ◦ σ)(t) = f(t), ∀t ∈ T¯ ; (5)
τ(σ(t)) < τˆ .
Since σ is an equilibrium in U
(Mτˆ , T¯ ) , we have that for any ti ∈ T¯i and alternative message
m′i,
Vi((σi, σ−i) , ti) ≥ Vi((m′i, σ−i) , ti). (6)
Then, by (5) and (6), the truth-telling is a Bayes Nash equilibrium in the incomplete infor-
mation game induced by the direct mechanism (T¯ , f). That is, for any ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i,∑
t−i
[
ui(f(ti, t−i), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi (σi (ti) , σ−i (t−i))
]
p¯ii(ti)[t−i]
≥
∑
t−i
[
ui(f(t
′
i, t−i), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi (σi (t
′
i) , σ−i (t−i))
]
p¯ii(ti)[t−i].
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Since τ(·) is bounded by τˆ and τˆ can be arbitrarily small, we have∑
t−i
p¯ii(ti)[t−i]ui(f(ti, t−i), θˆ(ti, t−i)) ≥
∑
t−i
p¯ii(ti)[t−i]ui(f(t′i, t−i), θˆ(ti, t−i)).
That is, the SCF f is incentive compatible.
5 Comparisons with Oury and Tercieux (2012)
Oury and Tercieux (OT, 2012) is the first to propose the notion of continuous implementation
as a strengthening of partial implementation. Specifically, a mechanism (resp. strictly)
continuously implements a social choice function f if, for any model which contains the
original benchmark model, there is a (resp. strict) Bayes Nash equilibrium that (i) induces
a pure strategy on the benchmark model and (ii) if a type t′ is close to some type t of the
original model, then the outcome provided at t′ is close to the desired outcome f(t). Then,
we say that a social choice function f is (resp. strictly) continuously implementable if there
is a mechanism which (resp. strictly) continuously implements f .
Theorem 3 of OT (which also implies Theorems 1 and 2 of OT) shows that strict interim
rationalizable monotonicity is a necessary condition for strict continuous implementation. As
strict interim rationalizable monotonicity implies (strict) Bayesian monotonicity, which is a
well-known necessary and “almost sufficient” condition for full implementation in Bayes Nash
equilibrium, a central message of OT is that while continuous implementation sounds weaker
than full implementation, it is strong enough to obtain full implementation.
There are four differences between our paper and OT. First, OT focus on “strict”
continuous implementation rather than continuous implementation in their Theorems 1-
3.15 To close the gap between continuous implementation and strict one, OT introduce
the slight cost of sending messages in the mechanism.16 OT show in their Theorem 4 that
an SCF is continuously implementable by a finite mechanisms if it is fully implementable
in rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism; moreover, the converse also holds when
15A related difference is that a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium constitutes, by definition, a pure strategy
profile in the benchmark model, whereas we do not impose this requirement (i) OT’s Definition 2.
16Oury (2015) adds an additional robustness to what she calls “local payoff uncertainty” to part of the
requirement of original continuous implementation. In so doing, she dispenses with the assumption of costly
messages, which was used in OT’s Theorem 4. See Oury (2015) for more details of the robustness to local
payoff uncertainty.
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sending messages is slightly costly. However, how to achieve (exact and full) rationalizable
implementation by a finite mechanism remains largely unknown to our knowledge.
Second, OT propose the notion of continuous implementation as a “local approach”,
as opposed to the “global approach” proposed by Bergemann and Morris (2005, 2009a,b).
In the global approach, all implicit common knowledge assumptions are relaxed and the
designer does not have a benchmark model in mind. In contrast, in the local approach the
robustness notion which OT and this paper study hinges on whether we perturb the players’
knowledge about their own payoff type or not (see Fudenberg et al. (1988) and Dekel and
Fudenberg (1990)). Indeed, footnotes 8 and 17 in Oury (2015) remarked that for the main
results of OT and Oury (2015) to hold, it is crucial that the players entertain some doubt
about their own payoff type in the perturbed model nearby the benchmark.17 Here we follow
Bergemann and Morris (2005, 2009a,b) in assuming that each player knows his payoff type
and this knowledge is maintained even when we perturb their information. In this case, we
obtain permissive continuous implementation results and our results cover SCFs which are
not (Bayesian) monotonic.
Third, OT’s result holds whether the designer can use transfers or not, although their
Theorem 4 builds on the assumption that sending messages incurs a small cost to the players
and their preferences are quasilinear in the cost. In contrast, we follow the classical mech-
anism design literature in assuming that the messages are cheap talk and the designer can
make use of arbitrarily small transfers, on and off the equilibrium. In other words, trans-
fer is part of the designer’s instrument in our setup whereas it is part of the environment
constraint in OT.
Finally, we impose Assumption 1 on the benchmark model T¯ , whereas OT consider
an arbitrary (finite) benchmark model. Indeed, the notion of continuous implementation
builds upon the designer’s uncertainty about the higher-order beliefs of the players. In this
17To wit, in proving their Theorem 1, OT construct a sequence of types nearby the complete-information
benchmark. The sequence of types assigns increasingly more probability on the payoff type θ′ and vanishing
probability on payoff type θ. The belief of these types (of agent i) are constructed so that they all believe
that the opponents have a fixed type profile t−i which has complete information about state θ, regardless of
these types’ belief about Θ. This is to ensure that the opponents of the type profile t−i play the equilibrium
message profile under state θ to start the contagion. When each player knows his own payoff type, however,
it is not possible that player i assigns probability one that t−i has complete information about θ yet player
i also assigns increasingly more probability on θ′ in which his opponents know θ′−i 6= θ−i.
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vein, the designer might also be concerned about having an alternative benchmark model
where the players’ hierarchies of beliefs lie in the neighborhood of the benchmark which she
postulates. Indeed, provided that each player has strategically distinguishable payoff types
(e.g., in Bergemann and Morris (2009a)), Assumption 1 holds for generic beliefs. As a result,
for every benchmark model, there is a “nearby” benchmark model in which Assumption 1
holds and our result applies. The designer cannot distinguish the two nearby benchmark
models in the lack of full knowledge about the players’ higher-order beliefs.
6 Conclusion
We show that continuous implementation with small transfers can be as permissive as it can
be. All we need is incentive compatibility, which is, by the revelation principle, a necessary
condition for partial Bayesian implementation. This exhibits a stark contrast with Berge-
mann and Morris (2005) who show that their global robustness amounts to ex post incentive
compatibility as well as Oury and Tercieux (2012) who show that (strict) continuous imple-
mentation is tightly connected to full implementation in rationalizable strategies. Our result
exemplifies the subtle issue of formulating a local robustness test for partial implementation.
A Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide all the proofs omitted from the main body of the paper.
A.1 Maximally Revealing Mechanism and Scoring Rules
In this section, we construct a generic maximally revealing mechanism and generic scoring
rules which will be the building blocks of our augmented mechanism. We first prove a lemma
which will be used to prove Lemmas 3 and 4.
A.1.1 A Preliminary Lemma
Let r¯ > 0 and M = ((Mi), g)i∈I denote a mechanism with zero transfer (i.e., τi (m) = 0 for
every m ∈ M and i ∈ I). Fix a player i. For any ti ∈ T¯i, any σ−i : T−i → M−i, and any
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messages mi and m
′
i in Mi with mi 6= m′i, we define the set
CM,rti,σ−i (mi,m
′
i) ≡
{
τi ∈ [−r¯, r¯]|M | : Vi((mi, σ−i) , ti) 6= Vi((m′i, σ−i) , ti)
}
where we recall that
Vi((mi, σ−i) , ti) =
∑
t−i
pii(ti)[t−i] [ui(g(mi, σ−i(t−i)), θ(t)) + τi(mi, σ−i(t−i))] .
In words, CM,rti,σ−i (mi,m
′
i) is the set of transfer rules defined on M which is bounded by r¯
and type ti is not indifferent between the pair of messages mi and m
′
i under conjecture σ−i.
Define CM,r¯i ≡
⋂
ti,σ−i
⋂
mi 6=m′i C
M,r¯
ti,σ−i (mi,m
′
i).
Lemma 2 Let M = ((Mi), g)i∈I denote a mechanism with zero transfer. Then, the comple-
ment of CM,ri has measure zero in R|M |.
Proof. Observe that the complement of CM,rti,σ−i (mi,m
′
i) is the set of solutions of a linear
equation in R|M |. Hence, the complement of CM,rti,σ−i (mi,m
′
i) is a hyperplane of R|M | with
dimension lower than |M | and thus has measure zero (see p. 52 of Rudin (1987)). Since
there are only finitely many types in T¯i, functions σ−i : T¯−i → M−i, and messages in Mi, it
follows that CM,ri also has measure zero.
A.1.2 A Generic Maximally Revealing Mechanism
First, Lemma 3 shows that we can add (arbitrarily) small transfers to the maximally re-
vealing mechanism MBM in Bergemann and Morris (2009b) so that it satisfies a generic
condition, namely, for any type and against any degenerate belief over the other players’
announcements (i.e., a mapping σ∗−i : T¯−i →M∗−i), any two distinct messages must result in
distinct payoffs. We call such a mechanism M∗ a generic maximally revealing mechanism
which we fix hereafter.
Lemma 3 For any τ˜ > 0, there exists a maximally revealing mechanismM∗ = ((M∗i ) , g∗, (τ ∗i ))i∈I
with the following properties: for each player i,
(a) |τ ∗i (·)| is bounded by τ˜ ;
(b) for any ti ∈ T¯i, any mi,m′i ∈ M∗i with mi 6= m′i, and any σ∗−i : T¯−i → M∗−i, we have
Vi(
(
mi, σ
∗
−i
)
, ti) 6= Vi(
(
m′i, σ
∗
−i
)
, ti);
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(c) Sˆ∞i (θi|M∗)∩ Sˆ∞i (θ′i|M∗) = ∅ if θi 6∼ θ′i.
Proof. Recall that MBM = (M∗, g∗) is the maximally revealing mechanism proposed by
Bergemann and Morris (2009b). Pick some r¯ < τ˜ . By Lemma 2, the complement of CM
BM,r¯
i
has measure zero in R|M∗|. For any transfer rule (τi)i∈I with τi : M∗ → R, denote by
MBM (τ) = ((M∗i )i∈I , g∗, (τi)i∈I) the mechanism which has the same sets of messages and
outcome function as the maximally revealing mechanism MBM but is augmented by the
transfer rule (τi)i∈I . Fix any player i. Define
Ci =
{
τi ∈ R|M∗| : Sˆ∞
(
θi|MBM (τ)
) ∩ Sˆ∞ (θ′i|MBM (τ)) = ∅ whenever θi 6∼ θ′i} .
It follows that Ci is a nonempty open set in R|M
∗|. Therefore, Ci ∩ CMBM,r¯i has positive
measure in R|M∗|. Thus, we can find a transfer rule τ ∗i ∈ Ci ∩ CM
BM,r¯
i . Then, M∗ =
((M∗i )i∈I , g
∗, (τi)i∈I) is the desired maximally revealing mechanism.
A.1.3 Generic Scoring Rules
Second, the transfer rule in the augmented mechanism consists of a number of proper scoring
rules. We prove Lemma 4 below to construct these proper scoring rules. For ease of stating
the lemma, denote by Ψ2i the partition over T¯i jointly induced by χ
1
i (·) and Ψ1i , i.e., Ψ2i ={
ψ2i (ti) : ti ∈ T¯i
}
in which for any types ti and t
′
i in T¯i, we have t
′
i ∈ ψ2i (ti) if and only if
χ1i (ti) = χ
1
i (t
′
i) and t
′
i belongs to ψ
1
i (ti). It follows from Assumption 1 that Ψ
2
i is the finest
partition over T¯i, namely that Ψ
2
i =
{{ti} : ti ∈ T¯i}. Hence, p¯ii (ti) can be identified with the
belief over Ψ2−i which we denote by χ
2
i (ti).
Indeed, Condition (c) in Lemma 4 says that for k = 0, 1, 2, if player i’s opponents
report the atom in Ψk−i which contains their true types, by the transfer rule d
k
i , each player
i must report truthfully his belief over Ψk−i. As in Lemma 3, Condition (b) in Lemma 4
says that the proper scoring rules are generic so that against any σ−i : T¯−i → T¯−i, there is a
unique best response.
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For any τ˜ > 0, any player i ∈ I, and any
k = 0, 1, 2, there exist γ > 0 and a function dki : T¯i × Ψk−i → R, satisfying the following
properties:
(a) |dki | is bounded by τ˜ /
(
l¯ + 5
)
;
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(b) for any ti ∈ T¯i, t′i and t′′i in T¯i with t′i 6= t′′i , and σ−i : T¯−i → T¯−i, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t−i∈T¯−i
[
dki (t
′
i, σ−i (t−i))− dki (t′′i , σ−i (t−i))
]
p¯ii (ti) [t−i]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > γ; (7)
(c) for every pair of types t′i and ti in T¯i with χ
k
i (t
′
i) 6= χki (ti), we have∑
t−i∈T¯−i
[
dki
(
ti, ψ
k
−i (t−i)
)− dki (t′i, ψk−i (t−i))] p¯ii(ti)[t−i] > γ. (8)
Proof. Fix any player i and k = 0, 1, 2. We first prove the existence of transfer rules dki
which satisfies Condition (c). Consider a mechanism M = ((Mj)j∈I , g) with zero transfer
such that Mi = T¯i and Mj = Ψ
k
j for every j 6= i and moreover, for some fixed outcome a,
we set g (m) = a for every m ∈ M . Pick some r¯ < τ˜/ (l¯ + 5). By Lemma 2, we note that
R|M |\CM,r¯i has measure zero in R|M |. Define
Dki =
di ∈ [−r¯, r¯]|M | :
∑
t−i∈T¯−i
[
di
(
ti, ψ
k
−i (t−i)
)− di (t′i, ψk−i (t−i))] p¯ii(ti)[t−i] > 0
whenever χki (t
′
i) 6= χki (ti)
 .
Since each proper scoring rule defined on T¯i × Ψk−i belongs to Dki , it follows that Dki is
nonempty (and open in R|M |).18 Therefore, Dki ∩ CM,r¯i has positive measure in R|T¯ |. Thus,
we can find a transfer rule dki ∈ Dki ∩CM,r¯i which satisfies (8). Then, dki satisfies Conditions
(a) and (b) since dki ∈ CM,r¯i and dki satisfies Condition (c) since dki ∈ Dki .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let M∗ be a maximally revealing
mechanism with transfer rule bounded by τˆ /3 and M¯ an extended direct mechanism. Then,
there exists an augmented mechanism M¯∗ = ((Mi) , g, (τi))i∈I such that (a) the transfer rule
τi (·) is bounded by τˆ ; (b) if the transfer size in M¯ is sufficiently small, then for each i ∈ I,
each ti ∈ T¯i, and each mi ∈ S∞i Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ), we have mli = ti for l = 2, ..., l¯ + 4.
The proof of Proposition 2 is divided into three main steps. First, we specify the
transfer rule and parameters in M¯∗ which make use of Lemma 4. We then turn to prove
Lemma 1 in Section 4.4. Finally, we make use of Lemma 1 to prove Proposition 2.
18For example, a proper quadratic scoring rule for k = 2 can be defined as 2p¯ii(ti) [t−i] − p¯ii(ti) · p¯ii(ti)
where “·” stands for the inner product of two vectors.
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A.2.1 Choice of Parameters for the Augmented Mechanism
Equipped with the functions constructed in Lemma 4, we are now ready to define the transfer
rules in our mechanism of Section 4.3.
First, recall that each m0−i which survives iterative elimination of strictly dominated
messages (Sˆ∞−i) uniquely identifies an atom in Pi and hence an element in Ψ0−i. We denote
this atom in Ψ0−i by ψ
0
−i
(
m0−i
)
. Then, we define
τ 0i (m
1
i ,m
0
−i) =
 d0i (m1i , ψ0−i (t−i)),0, if m
0
−i ∈ Sˆ∞−i(θˆ−i(t−i)|M∗) for some t−i ∈ T¯−i;
otherwise.
Second, we define
τ 1i (m
2
i ,m
1
−i,m
0
−i) = d
1
i (m
2
i , ψ
1
−i
(
m0−i,m
1
−i
)
),
where ψ1−i
(
m0−i,m
1
−i
)
denotes the unique atom ψ1−i in Ψ
1
−i such that ψ
1
−i ⊂ ψ0−i
(
m0−i
)
and
χ0−i (t−i) = χ
0
−i
(
m1−i
)
for every t−i ∈ ψ1−i.
Finally, let
τ 2i (m
l
i,m
l−1
−i ) = d
2
i (m
l
i,m
l−1
−i ), ∀l ≥ 3.
Now given τ˜ = τˆ /3, we set γ as the minimum of the γ given by Lemmas 3 and 4. We
denote by E the maximal payoff difference between an outcome resulted from the maximally
revealing mechanism M∗ and that resulted from the extended direct mechanism M¯, i.e.,
E ≡ max
m∗∈M∗,m¯∈M¯,θ∈Θ,i∈I
|ui (g∗(m∗), θ)− ui (g¯ (m¯) , θ)| . (9)
We choose  > 0 small enough so that γ > E. Moreover, let τ¯ > 0 be the bound of
the transfer rule in the extended direct mechanism M¯. In the proof of Property (b) of
Proposition 2, we set τ¯ sufficiently small so that
γ > E + τ¯ ; (10)
furthermore, τ < τˆ/3. Then, Property (a) of Proposition 2 holds, since
|τi(m)| ≤
∣∣τ ∗i (m0)∣∣+ ∣∣τ 0i (m1i ,m0−i)∣∣+ ∣∣τ 1i (m2i ,m1−i,m0−i)∣∣+ l¯+4∑
l=3
∣∣τ 2i (mli,ml−1−i )∣∣+ |τ¯i(m¯)|
≤ τˆ
3
+
τ˜
l¯ + 5
+
τ˜
l¯ + 5
+
l¯ + 3
l¯ + 5
τ˜ +
τˆ
3
≤ 2
3
τˆ + τ˜ ≤ τˆ . (11)
We then proceed to prove Property (b) of Proposition 2 in the next two steps.
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A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 1 will make use of Lemmas 3 and 4 as well as the following lemma
as the building blocks. Specifically, the lemma below shows that under the transfer rule τ 2i
which we identify in Lemma 4, for each misreported type t′i, there always exists a conjecture
σ−i which rationalizes this misreported t′i as the unique maximizer of transfers for the true
type ti.
Lemma 5 For any ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i, there exists σ−i : T¯−i → ∆
(
T¯−i
)
such that∑
t−i∈T¯−i
p¯ii (ti) [t−i]
∑
t˜−i∈T¯−i
[
τ 2i
(
t′i, t˜−i
)− τ 2i (t˜i, t˜−i)]σ−i (t−i) [t˜−i] > γ, ∀t˜i 6= t′i.
Proof. By Lemma 4, for type t′i, we have∑
t˜−i∈T¯−i
[
τ 2i
(
t′i, t˜−i
)− τ 2i (t˜i, t˜−i)] p¯ii (t′i) [t˜−i] > γ, ∀t˜i 6= t′i. (12)
We construct type ti’s conjecture denoted by σ−i : T¯−i → ∆
(
T¯−i
)
such that
σ−i (t−i)
[
t˜−i
]
= p¯ii (t
′
i)
[
t˜−i
]
,∀t−i, t˜−i ∈ T¯−i. (13)
Thus, we have ∑
t−i∈T¯−i
p¯ii (ti) [t−i]σ−i (t−i)
[
t˜−i
]
= p¯ii (t
′
i)
[
t˜−i
]
where the equality follows from (13). Thus, the lemma follows from (12).
We now turn to the proof of Lemma 1, which is restated below.
Lemma 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For any player i of type ti ∈ T¯i and any
l = 0, 1, ..., l¯, the following two statements, denoted by P 1(l) and P 2(l), hold:
• P 1(l): for any mˆi ∈Mi, mˆi ∈ Wˆ li (θˆi(ti)|M¯∗) implies mˆ0i ∈ Sˆli(θˆi(ti)|M∗);
• P 2(l): there is some (m0i , ...,mli,ml+1i ) ∈ ×l+1k=0Mk such that for every t′i ∈ T¯i,(
m0i , ...,m
l
i,m
l+1
i , t
′
i, ti, ..., ti
) ∈ Wˆ li (θˆi(ti)|M¯∗).
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove Lemma 1 by induction. We observe that P 1(0) and
P 2(0) hold trivially, since for any i ∈ I, we have Sˆ0i (θi|M∗) = M∗i for any θi ∈ Θi and
Wˆ 0i (θˆi(ti)|M¯∗) = Mi for any ti ∈ T¯i. Next, for each l ≥ 0, we assume that P 1(l) and P 2(l)
hold and prove that P 1(l + 1) and P 2(l + 1) also hold.
29
Consider player i of type ti and a message m
0
i 6∈ Sˆl+1i (θˆi(ti)|M∗).19 This implies that
there exists some α∗i ∈ ∆(M∗i ) such that
ui(g
∗(α∗i ,m
∗
−i), (θi, θ−i)) > ui(g
∗(m0i ,m
∗
−i), (θi, θ−i)) (14)
for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i and m∗−i ∈ Sˆl−i (θ−i|M∗).
Fix mi = (m
0
i ,m
1
i , . . . ,m
l¯+5
i ) ∈ Mi such that m0i 6∈ Sˆl+1i (θi|M∗). Let αi ∈ ∆(Mi) be a
mixed message that induces the same marginal distribution on M0i as α
∗
i and is identical to
mi otherwise. Thus, for any m−i ∈ Wˆ l−i (θ−i|M) and θ−i, we have
ui(g(αi,m−i), (θi, θ−i)) + τi (αi,m−i))
−ui(g(mi,m−i), (θi, θ−i)) + τi(mi,m−i)
= e(mi,m−i)
[
ui(g
∗(α∗i ,m
0
−i), (θi, θ−i))− ui(g∗(m0i ,m0−i)), (θi, θ−i))
]
≥ 0 (15)
where the equality follows because αi differs from mi only in the 0th round announcement
and the inequality follows from (14) and the induction hypothesis P 1 (l). Indeed, by P 1 (l),
if m−i ∈ Wˆ l−i
(
θ−i|M¯∗
)
, then we must have m0−i ∈ Sˆl−i (θ−i|M∗). Thus, the inequality in
(15) follows from (14).
In addition, by P 2 (l), for each t−i ∈ T¯−i, there exists some m˜−i ∈ Wˆ l−i(θˆ−i (t−i) |M¯∗)
such that m˜2−i 6= m˜k−i for some k ∈ {3, . . . , l¯+ 3}. Thus, e(mi, m˜−i) =  (by the definition of
e (·) in Section 4.3). Against m˜−i together with an arbitrary θ−i, the inequality in (15) be-
comes strict. Thus, the messagemi is weakly dominated by αi so thatmi /∈ Wˆ l+1i (θˆi (ti) |M¯∗).
Therefore, P 1(l + 1) holds.
Second, we shall prove P 2 (l + 1). By the induction hypothesis P 2 (l), we can define a
mapping ν−i : T¯−i → ×l+1k=0Mk−i such that for any types t−i and t′−i in T¯−i, we have
m˜−i(t−i, t′−i) ≡ (ν0−i(t−i), ..., νl+1−i (t−i), t′−i, t−i, ..., t−i) ∈ Wˆ l−i(θˆ−i (t−i) |M¯∗). (16)
19Throughout this section, we use m∗i to denote a generic element in M
∗
i .
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Moreover, for each ti ∈ T¯i, we define the “coordinate-wise” best reply as follows:{
b0i (ν−i, ti)
}
= arg max
m∗i∈M∗i
∑
t−i
ui(g
∗ (m∗i , ν0−i(t−i)) , θˆ(ti, t−i))p¯ii (ti) [t−i] . (17){
b1i (ν−i, ti)
}
= arg max
t′i∈T¯i
∑
t−i
τ 0i
(
t′i, ν
0
−i(t−i)
)
p¯ii (ti) [t−i] ; (18){
b2i (ν−i, ti)
}
= arg max
t′i∈T¯i
∑
t−i
τ 1i
(
t′i, ν
1
−i(t−i), ν
0
−i(t−i)
)
p¯ii (ti) [t−i] ; (19){
bk+1i (ν−i, ti)
}
= arg max
t′i∈T¯i
∑
t−i
τ 2i
(
t′i, ν
k
−i (t−i)
)
p¯ii (ti) [t−i] , ∀k = 2, ..., l + 1 (20)
where the uniqueness of the best reply {bki } for k 6= 1, 2 follows from Lemmas 3 and 4. We
now prove P 2 (l + 1) by establishing the following claim: for each ti ∈ T¯i,
m¯i ≡
(
b0i (ν−i, ti), b
1
i (ν−i, ti), . . . , b
l+2
i (ν−i, ti) , t
′
i, ti, ..., ti
) ∈ Wˆ l+1i (θˆi(ti)|M¯∗). (21)
First, by Lemma 5, for any t′i ∈ T¯i, there exists a mapping σ−i : T¯−i → ∆
(
T¯−i
)
such that∑
t−i∈T¯−i
p¯ii (ti) [t−i]
∑
t˜−i∈T¯−i
[
τ 2i
(
t′i, t˜−i
)− τ 2i (t˜i, t˜−i)]σ−i (t−i) [t˜−i] > γ, ∀t˜i 6= t′i. (22)
For each t−i ∈ T¯−i, pick st−i−i ∈ T¯−i such that
s
t−i
−i 6= t−i, if l = 0;
s
t−i
−i 6= ν1−i(t−i), if l ≥ 1.
We construct a conjecture σ¯ς−i : T¯−i → ∆
(
T¯−i
)
as:
σ¯ς−i (t−i)
[
t′−i
] ≡ (1− ς)σ−i (t−i) [t′−i]+ ςδst−i−i [t′−i] , ∀t−i, t′−i ∈ T¯−i
where ς ∈ (0, 1) and δ
s
t−i
−i
stands for the Dirac measure which assigns probability one to the
type profile s
t−i
−i . In words, σ¯
ς
−i modifies σ−i such that σ¯
ς
−i(t−i) is identical to σ−i(t−i) with
probability 1 − ς; moreover, σ¯ς−i (t−i) assigns probability ς to some type profile st−i−i which
is either distinct from t−i (if l = 0) or ν1−i(t−i) (if l ≥ 1). It follows from (22) that for ς
sufficiently small, we still have∑
t−i∈T¯−i
p¯ii (ti) [t−i]
∑
t˜−i∈T¯−i
[
τ 2i
(
t′i, t˜−i
)− τ 2i (t˜i, t˜−i)] σ¯ς−i (t−i) [t˜−i] > γ, ∀t˜i 6= t′i. (23)
Second, let νς−i : T¯−i → ∆ (M−i) be type ti’s conjecture defined as
νς−i (t−i)
[
m˜−i(t−i, t′−i)
] ≡ σ¯ς−i (t−i) [t′−i] ,∀t−i, t′−i ∈ T¯−i (24)
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where m˜−i(t−i, t′−i) is defined in (16). By (23), we have b
l+1
i (ν−i, ti) = t
′
i. Now define
µςi ∈ ∆ (Θ−i ×M−i) which is induced from ν−i and p¯ii (ti) as follows: for any (θ−i,m−i),
µςi (θ−i,m−i) =
∑
t−i∈T¯−i:θˆ−i(t−i)=θ−i
νς−i (t−i) [m−i] p¯ii (ti) [t−i] .
By (16) and (24), µςi (θ−i,m−i) > 0 implies m−i ∈ Wˆ l−i (θ−i|M).
Third, we show that against the belief µςi , message m¯i defined in (21) is a strictly better
reply for θˆi (ti) than any other message m˜i with m˜
k
i 6= m¯ki for some k. This together with the
fact that µςi (θ−i,m−i) > 0 implies m−i ∈ Wˆ l−i (θ−i|M) implies that m¯i ∈ Wˆ l+1i (θˆi(ti)|M¯∗).
It remains to show that m¯i is a strict best response against µ
ς
i . We show this by considering
the following two cases:
Case A: m˜0i 6= m¯0i and m˜ki = m¯ki for any k ≥ 1.
In this case, we have m¯2i 6= m˜2i . Then,∑
θ−i,m−i
[
ui(g(m¯i,m−i), θˆi (ti) , θ−i) + τi (m¯,m−i))
]
µςi (θ−i,m−i)
−
∑
θ−i,m−i
[
ui(g(m˜i,m−i), θˆi (ti) , θ−i) + τi(m˜i,m−i)
]
µςi (θ−i,m−i)
=
∑
θ−i,m−i
e((m¯i,m−i))µςi (θ−i,m−i)
×
[
ui(g
∗(m¯0i ,m
0
−i), θˆi (ti) , θ−i)− ui(g∗(m˜0i ,m0−i)), θˆi (ti) , θ−i)
]
(25)
where the equality follows because m˜ki = m¯
k
i for any k ≥ 1. Moreover, since the belief µςi is
induced from νς−i and p¯ii (ti), it follows that
µςi (θ−i,m−i) > 0⇒ (26)
there exist t−i, t
′
−i ∈ T¯−i such that m−i = m˜−i(t−i, t′−i), θˆ−i(t−i) = θ−i,
and either t′−i 6= ν1−i(t−i) or t′−i 6= t−i.
Observe that by (17),
ui(g
∗(m¯0i ,m
0
−i), θˆi (ti) , θ−i)− ui(g∗(m˜0i ,m0−i)), θˆi (ti) , θ−i)
= ui(g
∗(b0i (ν
0
−i, ti),m
0
−i), θˆi (ti) , θ−i)− ui(g∗(m˜0i ,m0−i)), θˆi (ti) , θ−i)
> 0.
It follows from (26) that there exist k ∈ {3, . . . , l¯+3} and m−i ∈M−i such that µςi(θi ,m−i) >
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0 and m2−i 6= mk−i. Hence, e (m¯i,m−i) =  for some m−i with µςi -positive probability. We
thus conclude that the payoff difference in (25) is positive. Thus, m¯i is a strictly better reply
than m˜i against the belief µ
ς
i for θˆi(ti) so that m¯i ∈ Wˆ l+1i (θˆi(ti)|M¯∗).
Case B: m˜ki 6= m¯ki for some k ≥ 1. We consider the following two subcases:
Case B1: m˜ki 6= m¯ki for some k with 1 ≤ k ≤ l¯ + 3.
We argue that for each such k, if m˜ki 6= m¯ki , then against νk−i, m¯ki ensures a gain more
than γ over m˜1i . For k = 1, the claim follows from (18) and Property (b) of Lemma 4
for transfer τ 0i (·). For k = 2, the claim follows from (19), Property (b) of Lemma 4 for
the transfer rule τ 1i (·). For 3 ≤ k ≤ l, the claim follows from (20) and Property (b) of
Lemma 4 for the transfer rule τ 2i (·). For k = l + 1, the claim follows from (23). Finally, for
l+ 2 ≤ k ≤ l¯+ 3, the claim follows from Property (c) of Lemma 4 for the transfer rule τ 2i (·).
Since µςi is induced from ν
ς
−i and p¯ii(ti), for ς > 0 sufficiently small, the gain from
changing m˜ki to m¯
k
i is at least γ, while the potential loss is at most E + τ¯ . Since γ >
E + τ¯ by (10), m¯i is strictly better than m˜i against the belief µ
ς
i for θˆi (ti). Hence, m¯i ∈
Wˆ l+1i (θˆi(ti)|M¯∗).
Case B2: m˜hi = m¯
h
i for any h with 1 ≤ h ≤ l¯+3 and m˜ki 6= m¯ki for some k ≥ l¯+4. It follows
from (16) that every message m˜−i(t−i, t′−i) on the support of ν
ς
−i (t−i) truthfully reports the
type t−i in the
(
l¯ + 3
)
th coordinate as well as all announcements in M¯ (from the (l¯ + 4)th
coordinate onwards). Since (c) of Lemma 4 holds (for k = l¯+ 3) and truth-telling is a strict
Bayes Nash equilibrium in the game U
(M¯, T¯ ) induced by the extended direct mechanism
M¯, it follows that m¯i is a strictly better reply than m˜i against any such m˜−i(t−i, t′−i). Hence,
m¯i is a strictly better reply than m˜i against the belief µ
ς
i for θˆi(ti). This completes the proof
of Lemma 1.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove this claim by induction. Consider any i ∈ I, ti ∈ T¯i with θˆi(ti) = θi, and
mi ∈ S0Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ). For each l ≥ 0, we denote by {ψli(ti)}ti∈T¯i the partition over T¯i
induced by {mli}mli∈T¯i where mli ∈ SlWˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ) for some ti ∈ T¯i. First, we show that
mi /∈ S1Wˆ∞
(
ti|M¯∗, T¯
)
if ψ1i (m
1
i ) 6= ψ1i (ti). Indeed, consider an alternative message:
m¯i = (m
0
i , ti,m
2
i , ...,m
l¯+5
i ),
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which is identical tomi except that m¯
1
i 6= m1i . By Lemma 1, we have that mˆ0j ∈ Sˆ∞j (θˆj(tj)|M∗)
for any mˆj ∈ S0Wˆ∞(tj|M¯∗, T¯ ) and any player j ∈ I. Against any conjecture ν−i : T¯−i →
M−i satisfying ν−i(t−i) ∈ S0Wˆ∞−i
(
t−i|M¯∗, T¯
)
for every t−i ∈ T¯−i, by Property (c) of Lemma
4, choosing mi rather than m¯i induces the loss of at least γ and no gain. Hence, mi is strictly
dominated by m¯i.
Now define ψli (ti) = ψ
2
i (ti) for any l ≥ 3. Also recall that by Assumption 1, ψli (ti) =
{ti} for any l ≥ 2. Now suppose that any l such that 1 ≤ l ≤ l¯+ 3 , we have ψli(mli) = ψli (ti)
for every mi ∈ SliWˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ). Then, we show that ψl+1i (ml+1i ) = ψl+1i (ti) for every
mi ∈ Sl+1i Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ). Suppose to the contrary that ψl+1i (ml+1i ) 6= ψl+1i (ti) for some
mi ∈ Sl+1i Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ). We choose m¯i to be identical to mi except that m¯l+1i = ti 6= ml+1i .
By (c) of Lemma 4, choosing mi rather than m¯i induces the loss of at least γ; while the
possible gain incurred results from outcome changes due to alternating different values of
function e(·), which is bounded by E, and possibly different transfers (when l = l¯ + 3) in
the extended direct mechanism M¯ whose difference is bounded by τ¯ . Hence, the total gain
is bounded by E + τ¯ . Since we have γ > E + τ¯ by (10), mi is still strictly dominated by
m¯i. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. If an SCF f is incentive compatible,
then it is implementable in S∞Wˆ∞ with arbitrarily small transfers.
We prove this proposition by the following steps. In the first step, we construct an
extended direct mechanism M¯ = (M¯i, g¯, τ¯i)i∈I such that |τ¯i (m)| < τ¯ for any m ∈ M
and τ¯ satisfies (10). In the second step, we show that the augmented mechanism M¯∗,
which connects the maximally revealing mechanism M∗ to M¯ and implements the SCF f
in S∞Wˆ∞ with arbitrarily small transfers, if the SCF f is incentive compatible. Let τˆ be an
arbitrary positive number.
A.3.1 The Construction of Mechanism M¯
Recall that we need to construct a mechanism M¯ = ((M¯i) , g¯, (τ¯i))i∈I . We define the mech-
anism as follows.
1. The message space:
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Each player i makes K + 1 simultaneous announcements of his own type. We index
each announcement by 1, . . . , K + 1. That is, player i’s message space is
M¯i = M¯
0
i × · · · × M¯Ki = T¯i × · · · × T¯i︸ ︷︷ ︸
K+1 times
,
where K is an integer to be specified later. Denote
m¯i =
(
m¯0, ..., m¯Ki
) ∈ M¯i, m¯ki ∈Mki , k ∈ {0, 1, ..., K} ,
and
m¯ =
(
m¯0, ..., m¯K
) ∈ M¯, m¯k = (m¯ki )i∈I ∈ M¯k = ×ki∈IM¯ki .
2. The outcome function:
The outcome function g¯ : M¯ → ∆ (A) is defined as follows: for each m¯ ∈M ,
g¯ (m¯) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
f
(
m¯k
)
. (27)
The outcome function consists of K equally weighted lotteries the kth of which depends
only on the I-tuple of the kth announcements.
3. The transfer rule:
Let ξ and η be positive numbers. Player i is to pay:
• ξ if he is the first player whose kth announcement (k ≥ 1) differs from his own
0th announcement (all players who are the first to deviate are fined).
ci
(
m¯0, ..., m¯K
)
=

ξ if there exists k ∈ {1, ..., K} s.t. m¯ki 6= m¯0i ,
and m¯k
′
j = m¯
0
j for all k
′ ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} for all j ∈ I;
0 otherwise.
(28)
• η if his kth announcement (k ≥ 1) differs from his own 0th announcement.
cki
(
m¯0i , m¯
k
i
)
=
 η if m¯ki 6= m¯0i ;0 otherwise. (29)
In total,
τ¯i (m¯) = −ci
(
m¯0, ..., m¯K
)− K∑
k=1
cki
(
m¯0i , m¯
k
i
)
. (30)
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4. We provide a summary of conditions which we impose on transfers:
Let D be the maximum gain for player i from altering the kth announcement
D ≡ max
ti,t′i∈T¯i,t−i∈T¯−i,θ∈Θ,i∈I
{ui(f(t′i, t−i), θ)− ui(f(ti, t−i), θ)} . (31)
Given the transfer bound τ¯ , we choose K large enough so that there are positive
numbers η and ξ satisfying the following conditions:
τ¯
2K
> η > 0; (32)
τ¯
2
> ξ >
D
K
. (33)
It then follows from (30), (32), and (33) that
|τ¯i (m)| < τ¯. (34)
A.3.2 Implementation in S∞Wˆ∞
Recall that in defining our main implementing mechanism M¯∗ in Section 4.3, we write
M¯i = M
l¯+4
i ×M l¯+5i where M l¯+4i = T¯i and M l¯+5i =
(
T¯i
)K
, which consists of K copies of T¯i.
For each mi ∈ M¯∗i , we denote by m¯i the projection of mi in M¯i. By Proposition 2, it follows
that mi ∈ S∞i Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ) only if ml¯+4i (= m¯0i )= ti. We now establish implementation in
S∞Wˆ∞ via mechanism M¯∗ by the following claim.
Claim 1 In the game U
(M¯∗, T¯ ), for every nonnegative integer k ≤ K, player i ∈ I, and
type ti ∈ T¯i, if mi ∈ S∞i Wˆ∞
(
ti|M¯∗, T¯
)
, then m¯ki = ti.
Proof. When k = 0, the result follows from Proposition 2. Fix k ≥ 0. The induction
hypothesis is that for every i ∈ I and ti ∈ T¯i, if mi ∈ S∞i Wˆ∞
(
ti|M¯∗, T¯
)
, then m¯k
′
i = ti for
any nonnegative integer k′ ≤ k.
Then, we show that if mi ∈ S∞i Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ), then m¯k′i = ti for any nonnegative
integer k′ ≤ k + 1. By the induction hypothesis, it suffices to prove that m¯k+1i = ti. The
basic idea is similar to Abreu and Matsushima (1994). Suppose instead that m¯k+1i 6= ti.
Let m˜i be a message in M¯
∗
i which is identical to mi except that m˜i reports the truth in the
(k + 1)st announcement in M¯i. We hereby slightly abuse the notation by writing m˜
k+1
i (as
opposed to the heavier notation m˜
k+1
i ) for the (k + 1)th announcement of m˜i in M¯i. We let
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Mˆ−i = {m−i ∈ M−i : m¯k+1−i = m¯0−i}. Fix a conjecture ν−i : T¯−i → M−i such that for each
t−i ∈ T¯−i,
ν−i(t−i) ∈ S∞i Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ).
We will show that
Vi((m˜i, ν−i), ti)− Vi((mi, ν−i), ti) > 0. (35)
We decompose the left-hand side of this inequality into the following two parts:
∑
t−i:ν−i(t−i)6∈Mˆ−i
 {ui(g(m˜i, ν−i(t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi(m˜i, ν−i(t−i))}−{ui(g(mi, ν−i(t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi(mi, ν−i(t−i))}
 p¯ii(ti)[t−i] (36)
+
∑
t−i:ν−i(t−i)∈Mˆ−i
 {ui(g(m˜i, ν−i(t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi(m˜i, ν−i(t−i))}−{ui(g(mi, ν−i(t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi(mi, ν−i(t−i))}
 p¯ii(ti)[t−i].
Then, we prove the inequality in (35) in the following two steps.
Step 1:
∑
t−i:ν−i(t−i)6∈Mˆ−i
 {ui(g(m˜i, ν−i(t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi(m˜i, ν−i(t−i))}−{ui(g(mi, ν−i(t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi(mi, ν−i(t−i))}
 p¯ii(ti)[t−i] > 0.
From the induction hypothesis, for every i ∈ I and ti ∈ T¯i, if mi ∈ S∞i Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ), then
m¯k
′
i = ti for any nonnegative integer k
′ ≤ k. When m−i 6∈ Mˆ−i, there exists some j 6= i such
that m¯k+1j 6= m¯0j . We compute the expected loss in terms of payments for player i of type ti
when playing mi rather than m˜i:∑
t−i:ν−i(t−i)6∈Mˆ−i
{τi (m˜i, ν−i(t−i))− τi (mi, ν−i(t−i))} p¯ii(ti)[t−i].
By choosing m˜i rather than mi, player i will avoid the fine, η according to the transfer rule
ck+1i (see (29)) and ξ according to the transfer rule ci (see (28)). That is, for any t−i ∈ T¯−i
such that ν−i(t−i) /∈ Mˆ−i,
τi (m˜i, ν−i(t−i))− τi (mi, ν−i(t−i)) = η + ξ.
In terms of outcome function g¯(·) of the mechanism M¯, we have∑
t−i:ν−i(t−i)6∈Mˆ−i
1
K
{
ui(f(m
k+1
i , ν
k+1
−i (t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i))
}
p¯ii(ti)[t−i]
−
∑
t−i:ν−i(t−i)6∈Mˆ−i
1
K
{
ui(f(m˜
k+1
i , ν
k+1
−i (t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i))
}
p¯ii(ti)[t−i] ≤ D
K
(37)
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This means that the possible gain from playing mi rather than m˜i is bounded by D/K.
Since ξ > D/K by (33), we have
η + ξ >
D
K
. (38)
This completes Step 1.
Step 2:
∑
t−i:ν−i(t−i)∈Mˆ−i

{
ui(g(m˜i, ν
k+1
−i (t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi(m˜i, ν
k+1
−i (t−i))
}
−{
ui(g(mi, ν
k+1
−i (t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i)) + τi(mi, ν
k+1
−i (t−i))
}
 p¯ii(ti)[t−i] > 0
When m−i ∈ Mˆ−i, for any j 6= i, we have m¯k+1j = m¯0j . From the induction hypothesis, for
every j ∈ I and tj ∈ T¯j, if mj ∈ Skj Wˆ∞(ti|M¯∗, T¯ ), then m¯k′j = tj, for any nonnegative
integer k′ ≤ k. We compute the expected loss in terms of payments for player i of type ti
when playing mi rather than m˜i:∑
t−i:ν−i(t−i)∈Mˆ−i
{τi (m˜i, ν−i(t−i))− τi (mi, ν−i(t−i))} p¯ii(ti)[t−i]
Consider ν−i : T¯−i →M−i such that ν−i(t−i) ∈ Mˆ−i for any t−i ∈ T¯−i. By choosing m˜i rather
than mi, player i will avoid the fine, η according to the transfer rule c
k−1
i . Note that the
message m˜i triggers the fine ξ for player i only if the message mi also triggers ξ. Hence, the
expected loss in terms of payments from choosing mi rather than m˜i in terms of the transfer
rule τ(·) is
τi (m˜i,m−i)− τi (mi,m−i) ≥ η
for any m−i ∈ Mˆ−i. Therefore, when playing mi rather than m˜i, the expected loss in terms
of payments is bounded below by η.
In terms of outcome function g¯(·) of the mechanism M¯, the possible gain for player i
of type ti to report mi rather than m˜i is
1
K
∑
t−i:ν−i(t−i)∈Mˆ−i
{
ui(f(m¯
k+1
i , ν
k+1
−i (t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i))− ui(f(m˜k+1i , νk+1−i (t−i)), θˆ(ti, t−i))
}
p¯ii(ti)[t−i],
because m˜i differs from mi only in the (k+1)st announcement. That is, by playing mi rather
than m˜i, the possible gain for player i of type ti is bounded above by 0 because the SCF f
is incentive compatible and νk+1−i (t−i) = m¯
0
−i is truthful. This completes Step 2.
Note that the argument of Claim 1 also shows that the truth-telling strategy profile
(σi)i∈I with σi (ti) = (ti, ..., ti) indeed constitutes a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium in the game
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U(M¯, T¯ ). Let m be a message profile in S∞Wˆ∞(t|M¯∗, T¯ ). To sum up, Claim 1 shows that
m¯k = t for any nonnegative integer k ≤ K. Moreover, ml = t for every l = 1, 2, ..., l + 3 and
hence e (m) = 0. It follows that g (m) = f (t). Finally, since |τ¯i (m)| < τ¯ by (34) and τ¯
satisfies (10), it follows from Proposition 2 that |τi (m)| ≤ τˆ . Moreover, as τˆ /3 in Proposition
2 is the bound of transfer rule ofM∗, we can make τˆ arbitrarily small by Lemma 3. Hence,
we complete the proof of Proposition 1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: Fix any model T such that T¯ ⊂ T and a mechanism M. Then, for any
t ∈ T¯ and any sequence {tn}∞n=0 in T such that tn →p t, we have S∞Wˆ∞(tn|M, T ) ⊂
S∞Wˆ∞(t|M, T ) for any n large enough.
Proof. Since M is finite, there is a nonnegative integer k∗ such that SkWˆ∞(t|M, T ) =
S∞Wˆ∞(t|M, T ) for every k ≥ k∗ and t ∈ T¯ . Thus, it suffices to show that for each
nonnegative integer k, type profile t ∈ T¯ , and sequence {tn}∞n=0 in T such that tn →p
t as n → ∞, there exists a natural number Nk ∈ N such that, for any n ≥ Nk, we
have SkWˆ∞ (tn|M, T ) ⊂ SkWˆ∞(t|M, T ). We prove this by induction. We observe that
Wˆ∞i (θˆi (ti) |M) = Wˆ∞i (θˆi (t′i) |M) whenever θˆi (ti) = θˆi(t′i) and θˆi (ti,n) = θˆi(ti) for any n
sufficiently large. Hence, the claim is true for k = 0. Now suppose that the claim holds for
k ≥ 0 and we will show that the claim is also valid for k + 1.
Fix mi /∈ Sk+1i Wˆ∞ (ti|M, T ). Let Σ¯−i be the set of conjectures ν¯−i : T¯−i → ∆ (M−i)
such that ν¯−i (t−i) ∈ Sk−iWˆ∞(t−i|M, T ) for every t−i ∈ T¯−i. Then, there is αi ∈ ∆ (Mi) such
that
β ≡ min
ν¯−i∈Σ¯−i
{Vi((αi, ν¯−i), ti)− Vi((mi, ν¯−i), ti)} > 0. (39)
where the minimum is attained since Σ¯−i is compact. Let (t−i)ε denotes an open ball
consisting of the set of types t′−i whose (k − 1)st order beliefs are ε-close to those of types
t−i. Since T¯−i is a finite set, by the induction hypothesis, there is some ε1 > 0 such that
SkWˆ∞−i(t
′
−i|M, T ) ⊂ SkWˆ∞−i(t−i|M, T ) for every t′−i ∈
⋃
t−i∈T¯−i (t−i)
ε1 and every t−i ∈ T¯−i.
Moreover, since T¯−i is a finite set, for all t−i, s−i ∈ T¯−i with s−i 6= t−i, we can also choose
ε2 > 0 so that we have (1) (t−i)
ε2 ∩ (s−i)ε2 = ∅ ; and (2)
ε2 < min
{
β
3D
∣∣T¯−i∣∣ , mint−i∈supp(p¯ii(ti)) p¯ii (ti) [t−i]2
}
. (40)
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Since tn →p t, for any ε > 0, there is n sufficiently large such that for any positive ε <
min {ε1, ε2}, we have20
|pii (ti,n) [(t−i)ε]− p¯ii (ti) [t−i]| < ε,∀t−i ∈ T¯−i. (41)
Now consider an arbitrary conjecture ν−i : T−i →M−i with ν−i
(
t′−i
) ∈ SkWˆ∞−i(t′−i|M, T )
for every t′−i ∈ T−i. Based on ν−i, if t−i ∈ T¯−i with p¯ii (ti) [t−i] > 0, we define
ν¯−i (t−i) [m−i] =
pii (ti,n)
[{
t′−i ∈ (t−i)ε : ν−i
(
t′−i
)
= m−i
}]
pii (ti,n) [(t−i)
ε]
; (42)
and if p¯ii (ti) [t−i] = 0, let ν¯−i (t−i) assign probability one to some m−i ∈ Sk−iWˆ∞(t−i|M, T ).
It follows from the choice of ε and n that
|Vi((αi, ν−i), ti,n)− Vi((αi, ν¯−i), ti)| < β/3; (43)
|Vi((mi, ν−i), ti,n)− Vi((mi, ν¯−i), ti)| < β/3. (44)
Hence, it follows from (39), (43), and (44) that
Vi((αi, ν−i), ti,n)− Vi((mi, ν−i), ti,n)
= Vi((αi, ν¯−i), ti)− Vi((mi, ν¯−i), ti) + [Vi((αi, ν−i), ti,n)− Vi((αi, n¯u−i), ti)]
+ [Vi((mi, ν¯−i), ti)− Vi((mi, ν−i), ti,n)]
> β − β
3
− β
3
=
β
3
> 0.
Since ν−i is chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that mi /∈ Sk+1i Wˆ∞ (ti,n|M, T ).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4: Fix any model T such that T¯ ⊂ T and any mechanism M. Then, there
exists an equilibrium σ in the game U (M, T ) such that for any player i of type ti, we have
σi (ti) ∈ Wˆ∞i (θˆi(ti)|M).
We start from providing two definitions which we use in Lemma 6 below. We then
invoke Lemma 6 to prove Proposition 4. Here, we identify U (M, T ) with an agent-normal
form game where each ti ∈ Ti is a player and Mi the set of actions of ti; moreover, given any
σ−i : T−i →M−i, the payoff of ti of playing a message mi is denoted by Vi ((mi, σ−i) , ti).
20This follows from the fact that the Prohorov distance between ti,n and ti converges to 0. See (Dudley,
2002, pp. 398, 411).
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Definition 8 A ζ-perturbation of U (M, T ), which we denote by U ζ (M, T ), is another
agent-normal form game with |V ζi ((mi, σ−i) , ti)− Vi ((mi, σ−i) , ti) | ≤ ζ for every mi ∈ Mi,
every σ−i : T−i →M−i, and every ti ∈ Ti.
The following definition is a restatement of Property (10.3.1) of Van Damme (1991) in
the agent-normal form game U (M, T ).
Definition 9 Let U(M, T ) be an incomplete information game induced from mechanismM
and model T . We say that a set of (Nash) equilibria F of game U(M, T ) is quasi-stable if,
for every ε > 0, there exists ζ > 0 such that for every ζ-perturbation U ζ (M, T ) of U (M, T ),
there is an equilibrium of U ζ (M, T ) which is within ε-distance from the set F .
Proposition 4 follows from Lemma 6 below. The lemma below essentially restates
a well known result that each Kohlberg-Mertens stable set contains a stable set of any
truncated game obtained by eliminating a weakly dominated strategy. Indeed, the argument
in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) remains valid in the agent normal-form of any game such
that there are countably many players (where each player corresponds to a type) and each
player has finitely many pure messages. We reproduce the proof to make the argument
self-contained.
Lemma 6 Let F be a quasi-stable set of equilibria in the game U(M, T ). Assume that
m′i /∈ Wˆ 1i (θi|M). Then, there is a quasi-stable set of equilibria F ′ ⊂ F such that σi (m′i) = 0
for every equilibrium σ in F ′.
Proof. Let F ′ = {σ ∈ F : σi (ti) [m′i] = 0}. We shall show that F ′ is a quasi-stable set of
equilibria in U(M, T ). Since m′i /∈ Wˆ 1i (θi|M), there is some αi ∈ ∆ (Mi) such that αi weakly
dominates m′i in the game U(M, T ).
Fix ε > 0. Let U ζ (M, T ) be a ζ-perturbation of the game U (M, T ) for some ζ > 0.
In addition, we add ζ ′ > 0 to the corresponding payoff from player i’s messages other than
m′i. That is, for any conjecture σ−i : T−i →M−i, we satisfy the following two properties: (1)
V ζ,ζ
′
i ((mi, σ−i) , ti) = V
ζ
i ((mi, σ−i) , ti) + ζ
′, for all mi 6= m′i; and (2) V ζ,ζ
′
i ((m
′
i, σ−i), ti) =
V ζi ((m
′
i, σ−i), ti). Thus, we obtain U
ζ,ζ′ (M, T ) as a ζ ′-perturbation of the game U ζ (M, T ).
Since F is quasi-stable in U(M, T ), there exist ζ > 0 and ζ ′ > 0 small enough so that the
game U ζ,ζ
′
(M, T ) has a Bayes Nash equilibrium σζ,ζ′ which is within ε-distance from F .
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Moreover, in the game U ζ,ζ
′
(M, T ), for any type ti with conjecture σ : T−i →M−i, we have
V ζ,ζ
′
i ((αi, σ−i) , ti) > V
ζ,ζ′
i ((m
′
i, σ−i) , ti) .
Therefore, m′i cannot be a best response to σ
ζ,ζ′
−i for player i of type ti, i.e., σ
ζ,ζ′
i (ti) [m
′
i] = 0.
For any ζ ′ > 0, σζ,ζ
′
is within ε-distance from F . Thus, we have that σζ,0 is a Bayes Nash
equilibrium in the game U ζ (M, T ) such that σζ,0 is within ε-distance from F ′. In other
words, F ′ is also quasi-stable.
We now turn to prove Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4. It follows from the closed graph property of the Nash equilibrium
correspondence that the set of Nash equilibria in the agent normal-form game of U (M, T )
is quasi-stable (see Van Damme (1991)). Hence, the proposition is proved by repeatedly
applying Lemma 6 after we remove each of the (finitely many) weakly dominated message
in deriving Wˆ l for each l (where within round l, the order of removal does not matter).
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